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The Administration's Clear Skies initiative and all competing legislative proposals take a 
pollutant-by-pollutant approach to address air pollution problems caused by emissions of both 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO2). As a result they miss an important opportunity 
to cut compliance costs without reducing expected environmental protection.   
 
  For a scenario where firms could use permits to emit three tons of NOx instead of one 
ton of SO2, we estimate that compliance costs would fall by more than $1 billion per year 
relative to emissions caps like those in Clear Skies. Yet expected environmental damages would 
not increase because the projected damages from three tons of NOx are roughly the same as 
from one ton of SO2.  To ensure that new air pollution legislation is cost-effective, Congress 
should allow firms to exchange NOx and SO2 permits at a rate that reflects relative 




Clean Air for Less: Exploiting Tradeoffs Between Different Air Pollutants 
Randall Lutter and Dallas Burtraw 
 
Introduction 
  President Bush has announced his Administration’s Clear Skies Initiative to 
regulate power plant emissions, including nitrogen oxides (“NOx”) and sulfur dioxide 
(“SO2”).
1  This initiative was introduced in the 107
th Congress in a bill sponsored by 
Senator Bob Smith (R-NH).
2  A competing bill proposed by Senator James Jeffords (I-
VT) narrowly passed the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee in June 
2002.
3   Both the Clear Skies Initiative and the Jeffords’ Proposal take a “cap and trade” 
approach
4 to achieve dramatic emission reductions by limiting emissions on a pollutant-
by-pollutant basis.
5  These approaches, however, both miss an opportunity to 
simultaneously reduce compliance costs and environmental damages because they do not 
                                                           
1 See White House Clear Skies Initiative Fact Sheet, President Bush Announces Clear Skies & Global 
Climate Change Initiatives (February 14, 2002) (announcing President George W. Bush’s plan to reduce 
NOx and SO2 by 70%), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/clear_skies_factsheet.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).   
2 S. 2815, 107
th Cong. (2002).  Companion legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives as 
H.R. 5266, 107
th Cong. (2002) by Rep. Joe Barton (R-TX). 
3 See Press Release, Senate Environment and Public Works, Majority Office, Jeffords Moves Clean Power 
Act Out of Committee (June 27, 2002) (announcing the passage of the Clean Power Act through the Senate 
Environment and Public Works Committee), available at http://epw.senate.gov/maj_pr_062702b.htm (last 
visited  Dec. 20, 2002).  Jefford’s Proposal differs from the Clear Skies Initiative in that it calls for 
mandatory carbon emission cuts.  See Senator James Jeffords, Statement on Clear Skies Proposal for the 
Senate Committee On Environment and Public Works (July 29, 2002), available at 
http://jeffords.senate.gov/~jeffords/press/02/06/07292002clear_skies.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). 
4 The cap and trade program establishes federally enforceable emissions limits for each pollutant and 
allows sources to transfer these among themselves to achieve the required reductions at the lowest cost.   
See EPA, Fact Sheet on Clear Skies Initiative (2002) (describing Clear Skies Initiative mandatory   
emissions reduction plan based on a cap and trade program), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/clearskes/clearskiesfactsheet_3_26.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002); see also Clean 
Power Act of 2001, S. 556, 107th Cong. § 132(b) (2001) (providing the objectives, guidelines, and 
authority for EPA activity in this area).    
5  S. 2815, 107
th Cong.  § 403 (2002); Press Release, Senate Environment and Public Works, Majority 
Office, Jeffords Moves Clean Power Act Out of Committee (June 27, 2002), available at 
http://epw.senate.gov/maj_pr_062702b.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).     2 
 
 
allow trading between pollutant limitations.  In particular, the legislative proposals 
prohibit tradeoffs between two pollutants that cause similar environmental problems, 
NOx and SO2.
6  
We recommend allowing trading between pollutants.  Market forces would not 
only act to affect the supply of NOx and SO2 permits but also the relative stringency of 
controls for each pollutant.  Trading between pollutants could both reduce compliance 
costs and increase expected environmental benefits.
7   Cost savings from integrating NOx 
and SO2 markets could exceed $1.1 billion per year without a reduction in expected 
environmental benefits.
8 
Trading between NOx and SO2 emissions makes sense for three reasons.  First, 
these pollutants have similar environmental effects.  For example, the biggest reason, by 
far, for stringent new emissions limits is that both NOx and SO2  raise concentrations of 
fine particulate matter (PM),
9 which in turn boosts mortality risk
10 and restricts 
visibility.
11  Both pollutants also contribute to high levels of acidity in lakes and forests.
12  
And while it is true that nitrogen, but not sulfur, contributes to eutrophication of water 
bodies,
13 controlling this eutrophication through better farm practices is likely to be much 
                                                           
6 See, eg., S. 2815, 107
th Cong. § 403 (2002) (omitting trading between NOx and SO2 ). 
7 See infra Environmental Damages section. 
8 See id. We believe that these may be the first estimates of cost savings from trading a permit to emit one 
type of pollutant for a permit to emit another type.  
9 NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT-RTP OFFICE, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, EPA/600/P-99/002AC, THIRD  EXTERNAL  REVIEW  DRAFT OF AIR  QUALITY  CRITERIA FOR 
PARTICULATE  MATTER  Vol.1, page E-5 (APRIL, 2002), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ncea/pdfs/partmatt/VOL_I_AQCD_PM_3rd_Review_Draft.pdf  
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002). 
10 Id. at E-23.  
11 Id. at E-32. 
12 Id. at E-28. 
13 Eutrophication is an increase in the rate of supply of organic matter to a water body, and usually refers to 
an increase in the rate of algal production.  See Chris Clement, S. B. Bricker & D.E. Pirhalla, Eutrophic 
Conditions in Estuarine Waters, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION.   
STATE OF THE COAST  REPORT (2001), at    http://state-of-coast.noaa.gov/bulletins/html/eut_18/intro.html     3 
 
 
cheaper than regulations on power plants.
14  Furthermore, while NOx, but not SO2, raises 
ozone concentrations,
15 the public health implications of ozone are quite small compared 
with the public health effects of elevated PM.
16   
Second, increasing one pollutant in exchange for reductions in the other would 
affect only a fraction of total anthropogenic emissions because utilities are only one of 
many sources of NOx and SO2.
17  To the extent that legislative proposals reduce NOx and 
SO2 emissions from power plants, they make these emissions sources increasingly 
unimportant relative to other sources.
18  
Third, the Clean Air Act still requires states to implement federally approved 
plans to attain health-based air quality standards by reducing emissions in those areas 
where air quality does not adequately protect public health.
19  Continued enforcement of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002); Nitrogen but not sulfur is a plant nutrient.  See F LORIDA  COOPERATIVE 
EXTENSION  SERVICE, INSTITUTE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL  SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA,  A 
BEGINNER'S  GUIDE TO WATER  MANAGEMENT  – NUTRIENTS  n.2 (2002), available at, URL: 
http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/BODY_FA079#FOOTNOTE_2 (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). N.B.: this reference 
does not explicitly state that sulfur is not a nutrient.  
14 A variety of studies substantiate this point, although they all poorly address the costs of implementing 
and enforcing control measures.  See, e.g., COASTAL  OCEAN  PROGRAM, NAT’L  OCEANIC AND 
ATMOSPHERIC  ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, DECISION  ANALYSIS  SERIES  NO. 20, 
EVALUATION OF THE ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF METHODS FOR REDUCING NUTRIENT LOADS TO 
THE  GULF OF MEXICO Tables B.1, B.3 (1999), available at 
http://www.nos.noaa.gov/pdflibrary/hpox_t6final.pdf  
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002).    
15 See EPA National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone:  Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,858 (July 18, 
1997); 40 C.F.R. §§50.1-50.12. 
16 Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, EPA, Regulatory Impact Analyses for the Particulate 
Matter and Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards and Proposed Regional Haze Rule 16-17 
(1997) (Executive Summary), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/naaqsfin/ria.html  
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002). 
17 See WHITE HOUSE CLEAR SKIES INITIATIVE POLICY BOOK 3  (February 14, 2002) (stating that power 
plants emit 67% of all SO2  emissions and 25 % of all NOx emissions), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/ro_clear_skies_book.pdf  (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). The proposed new 
legislation would reduce power plant emissions by 75 %.  See infra Legislative Proposal section.  The 
share of SO2 and NOx emissions from power plants after reductions would fall to about 34% and 8%, 
respectively, assuming that emissions from other sources do not change.  A hypothetical increase in 
emissions of 20% of these values would be less than 5% for SO2 and less than 2% for NOx.   
18 See Press Release, supra note 5. 
19 See Clean Air Act § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2002).     4 
 
 
the Clean Air Act implies that, even under a trading regime, states still enforce limits that 
attain health-based air quality standards. 
Market prices for NOx and SO2 emissions permits do not correspond with 
available information on environmental damages.  In 2001, SO2 allowances traded for 
between $152 and $211,
20 while NOx permits in the northeast regional market traded at 
around $2,000.
21  Yet a ton of SO2 causes environmental damages 3 to 5 times larger than 
a ton of NOx, according to government estimates.
22  Thus, it is not economically sensible 
for the more damaging pollutant to be subject to less costly controls.  Allowing tradeoffs 
between NOx and SO2 is one way to avoid such outcomes.  
The idea that NOx and SO2 emissions permits can be traded for one another is not 
new.  Amendments to the Clean Air Act provide: “Not later than January 1, 1994, the 
Administrator shall furnish to the Congress a study evaluating the environmental and 
economic consequences of amending this subchapter to permit trading sulfur dioxide 
                                                           
20  See EPA Clean Air Market Programs, Cumulative SO2 Trading Activity Table, at   
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/so2market/cumchart.html  (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (charting 
estimates of year 2000 S02 allowance trading volume); EPA Clean Air Market Programs, Monthly Average 
Price of Sulfur Dioxide Allowances, at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/so2market/pricetbl.html (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2002) (noting that price information originated with the brokerage firm Cantor Fitgerald 
and Fieldston Publications market survey). 
21 No centralized source exists for market price information.  This is a conservative estimate reflecting 
discussions with staff at trading firms, government economists, and some independent reports.  See 
generally EPA Clean Air Market Programs, Nox Allowance Market Analysis (April, 2001),  at 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarket/trading/noxmarket/pricetransfer.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (showing 
estimates of market information).  N.B.: NOx emissions allowance trading currently pertains to a five-
month seasonal program, rather than the annual restrictions included in legislative proposals.  Allowance 
prices are greater under a seasonal program because capital costs must be recovered over a smaller amount 
of emission reductions.   See Dallas Burtraw et al.,  Cost-Effective Reduction of NOX  Emissions from 
Electricity Generation, 51 J. AIR & WASTE MANAGEMENT 1482-84 (2001); see also DALLAS BURTRAW, 
RANJIT BHARVIRKAR & MEGAN MCGUINNESS, UNCERTAINTY AND THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF REGIONAL 
NOX EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS FROM ELECTRICITY GENERATION 29-31 (Resources for the Future Discussion, 
2002), available at http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/PDF_files/0201.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) 
22  See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT.  AND  BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS 46 (June 2000), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2000fedreg-
report.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (presenting ranges of monetary benefits for reducing emissions of 
NOx, SO2, particulate matter, and hydrocarbons).     5 
 
 
allowances for nitrogen oxides allowances.”
23  Unfortunately, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) has not implemented this directive.
24   Independent 
researchers have studied economic gains from inter-pollutant trading but have been 
unable to persuade policymakers to adopt this type of trading.
25  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I shows that current 
legislative proposals to limit power plant emissions do not allow trading between 
pollutants or any integration of the markets for both pollutants.  In Section II we argue 
that trading of NOx and SO2 emissions can create economic and environmental benefits.  
Section III presents a quantitative analysis showing that the integration of NOx and SO2 
markets could save more than $1 billion annually.  Before concluding, we show, in 
Section IV, that integrating markets could also increase environmental protection.  
 
I.  Legislative Proposals to Limit Power Plant Emissions Do Not Allow Trading 
Between Pollutants.  
 
Current law allows for trading of SO2 emissions from fossil-fired power plants, 
subject to an aggregate emission cap established under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air 
Amendments.
26  Affected facilities may trade and bank SO2  allowances, but the aggregate 
cap is fixed without regard to how much NOx emission reduction the facilities might be 
willing to offer in exchange for an increase in SO2.   Emissions of NOx from fossil-fired 
                                                           
23 Clean Air Amendments of 1990 § 403c, 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (1990), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa.text (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). 
24 Phone conversation with EPA staff member, EPA Clean Air Markets, Office of Air and Radiation, 
October 18, 2001. 
25 See generally, e.g., ALAN KRUPNICK, ET AL., COST-EFFECTIVE NOX CONTROL IN THE EASTERN UNITED 
STATES  21  (Resources for the Future, 2000), available at 
http://www.rff.org/CFDOCS/disc_papers/PDF_files/0018.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (suggesting that 
the EPA should consider altering its trading policy to achieve greater economic efficiency).     6 
 
 
plants are also regulated under Title IV, but according to an emission rate standard rather 
than an emission cap.
27  Emission trading is allowed for NOx  under regulations that are 
specified by the Environmental Protection Agency.
28  
Most current bills addressing air pollution of power plants apply a cap-and-trade 
approach to emissions of NOx and SO2  individually 
29 and none allow tradeoffs in the 
aggregate levels of emissions between different pollutants.  The Senate Environment and 
Public Works Committee passed Senator Jeffords’ S.556 to reduce power plant emissions 
of each pollutant by roughly 75% and to allow for trading of emissions allowances.
30  The 
Bush Administration’s Clear Skies Initiative proposes final caps on SO2, NOx, and 
mercury emission allowances similar to those of the Jeffords’ bill,
31 but allows a longer 
timeline over which to achieve them.
32  Whereas the Jeffords’ bill would accomplish 
complete reductions by 2008, the Bush Clear Skies approach would not mandate final 
                                                                                                                                                                             
26 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7700 (1994).  The annual cap pertains to the 
allocation of emission allowances. Annual emissions may be greater than actual annual allocations because 
of the opportunity to bank allowances from previous year allocations.  
27 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7700 (1994). 
28 Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport 
Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 40 C.F.R. pts. 
51,72,75, 96 (2001). 
29 See, e.g., Clean Power Act of 2001, S. 556, 107
th Cong. § 132(b) (2001); Clean Smokestacks Act of 
2001, H.R. 1256, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001); Acid Rain Control Act of 2001, S. 588, 107th Cong. § 4(a) 
(2001); EPA Fact Sheet on Clear Skies Initiative 2-3, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/final_clearskiesfactsheetjul.pdf  (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (noting that 
existing SO2 cap and trade provisions served as a model for the Clean Skies Initiative).  For a point-by-
point comparison of the major proposals to regulate multiple pollutants from the electricity sector, see: 
Resources for the Future, Making Sense of Multipollutant Legislation, at 
http://www.rff.org/multipollutants/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). 
30 See Clean Power Act of 2001, S. 556, 107th Cong. § 132(b) (2001).  
31 Compare the President’s Clear Skies Initiative aims to cap SO2 emission allowances at 3 million tons, 
NOx at 1.7 million tons, and mercury (“Hg”) at 15 tons with Jefford’s proposal. 
32  See  EPA Fact Sheet on Clear Skies Initiative 2-3, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/final_clearskiesfactsheetjul.pdf  (last visited Dec. 20, 2002); see also White 
House Clear Skies Initiative Fact Sheet, President Bush Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change 
Initiatives (February 14, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/clear_skies_factsheet.pdf (last 




33  Both Clear Skies and the Jeffords’ Bill provide for limits that can 
be achieved by trading among sources within a particular pollutant but not between 
different pollutants.
34  Figure 1 summarizes the caps on NOx and SO2 emissions that 
these bills would put in place alongside estimates of the emissions that would occur in 
2007 without new legislation.
35   
Late in the 107
th Congress Senator Tom Carper (D-DE) introduced S.3135 as an 
intended compromise proposal.
36  The bill would establish caps for SO2 of 2.25 million 
tons, equivalent to S. 556, but not fully phased in until 2015.  It would establish a cap of 
1.7 million tons for NOx, the same as the Clear Skies Initiative, but this would be 
achieved by 2012.  The bill includes mercury limits that are midway between the other 
bills and caps for carbon dioxide (“CO2“), a greenhouse gas, more moderate than S. 556.  
Like S. 556 and S. 2815, the bill would treat NOx and SO2 as two separate pollution 
problems and prohibit tradeoffs in aggregate emissions of these two pollutants. 
                                                           
33 See White House Clear Skies Initiative Fact Sheet, President Bush Announces Clear Skies & Global 
Climate Change Initiatives (February 14, 2002), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/clear_skies_factsheet.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).  Senator Jeffords’ bill, 
S.556, limits the three pollutants to 2.24 million, 1.51 million, and 4.8 tons, respectively, in 2007.   See 
OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC  PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A MULTI-EMISSIONS STRATEGY Table 1 (Prepared for Senators James M. Jeffords 
and Joseph I. Lieberman, October 31, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/jeffordslieberm.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2002). Both proposals allow banking so annual emissions may remain above annual 
allocations of emission allowances until the bank is exhausted.    
34  See EPA, Fact Sheet on Clear Skies Initiative (2002), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/clearskes/clearskiesfactsheet_3_26.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (describing Clear 
Skies Initiative mandatory emissions reduction plan based on a cap and trade program).  The cap and trade 
program establishes federally enforceable emissions limits for each pollutant and allows sources to transfer 
these among themselves to achieve the required reductions at the lowest cost.  See also Clean Power Act of 
2001, S. 556, 107th Cong. § 132(b) (2001) (providing the objectives, guidelines, and authority for EPA 
activity in this area).   
35 See generally ENERGY INFO. ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF INTEGRATED ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING, 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SR/OIAF-2001-04, REDUCING EMISSIONS OF SULFUR DIOXIDE, NITROGEN OXIDES, 
AND  MERCURY FROM ELECTRIC  POWER  PLANTS  Table ES-1 (2001),  available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/mepp/pdf/sroiaf(2001)04.pdf  
  (last visited Dec. 20, 2002)  (analyzing the impact of three scenarios for reducing power sector emissions 
of NOx, SO2 and Hg). 
36 Clean Air Planning Act of 2002, S. 3135, 107
th Cong. (2002).     8 
 
 
Policymakers’ neglect of trading between NOx and SO2 is surprising because 
trading between two pollutants seems a textbook example of a cost-effective regulatory 
strategy that can create economic and environmental benefits. 
 
II. Integrating  NOx AND SO2 Allowance Markets Can Create Economic and 
Environmental Benefits.  
 
A. Integrating NOx AND SO2 allowance markets can avoid unnecessary 
costs imposed by FIXED statutory limits. 
 
Standard conditions for cost-effective environmental protection are that the 
incremental control cost relative to the incremental damages avoided must be the same 
for each pollutant.
37  Congressional proposals that specify caps on NOx and SO2 without 
(apparent) regard to relative incremental costs and damages are therefore very likely to 
be unnecessarily costly.  
To demonstrate this point, suppose emissions of NOx and SO2 were capped at Nc 
and Sc respectively, i.e., point K on Figure 2.  The rate that SO2 emissions can substitute 
for NOx emissions (and NOx emissions cuts for SO2 emissions cuts) without increasing 
environmental damages is given by the slope of the iso-damage curve reflecting all the 
combinations of emissions that give damages D2. The rate that SO2 emissions can 
substitute for NOx emissions (and NOx cuts for SO2 cuts), without increasing compliance 
costs is the slope of the iso-cost curve reflecting control costs C2.  Any shift in emissions 
that decreases NOx and increases SO2 while keeping emissions within the lens-shaped 
area formed by D2 and C2 would improve environmental protection while reducing 
compliance costs.  In Figure 2, both environmental damages and compliance costs could 
                                                           
37 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 47 (1988).       9 
 
 
be reduced by an emissions control strategy that reduced NOx emissions and increased 
SO2 emissions. Cost-effective NOx  and SO2  emissions caps occur only at points of 
tangency of iso-damage and iso-cost curves, like point J, which is at the point of 
tangency of C1 and D1.
38  Thus, the relative costs and the relative effects of the two 
pollutants on environmental damages are crucial to ensuring that emissions control 
policies avoid unnecessary costs.   Legislative proposals that arbitrarily fix the ratio of 
emissions forego opportunities simultaneously to lower costs and improve the 
environment.    
  Estimating the potential gains from integrating NOx and SO2 markets requires 
information about how the costs and relative environmental benefits change with changes 
in the mix of emissions.
39  We address these below. 
B. Estimating Benefits of Integrating NOX and SO2 Markets Requires 
Information on Relative Control Costs. 
 
We review existing estimates of relative control costs and then present some of 
our own.  Developing estimates of the potential gains from integrating NOx and SO2 
markets requires information about more than the relative incremental controls cost at 
emissions levels likely to result from legislative proposals.  As we have just shown, it 
also requires information about how control costs change as the mix of emissions shifts.  
Government agencies have not yet estimated total incremental control costs for NOx and 
SO2 for different mixes of these two pollutants, so we develop our own estimates of 
control costs after reviewing some estimates that government agencies have already 
completed. 
                                                           
38 See id. at 45-47, 169-72.        10 
 
 
1.  Recent Government Estimates. 
The EPA and the Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) have prepared 
studies of permit pricing of NOx and SO2 under various emission control scenarios.  None 
of these reports are directly comparable, however, since they are based on different 
assumptions. 
In its analysis of the Clear Skies Initiative, EPA estimated relative permit prices 
for NOx and SO2 emissions that vary significantly by region and by stage of 
implementation.
40  Because the Bush Administration’s proposal would separate the NOx 
permit market into an eastern and western region, the relative costs of controlling the two 
pollutants differ by region.
41  EPA’s estimates show that the permit price of SO2 relative 
to the permit price of NOx, given the Clear Skies Initiative emissions reductions of 67% 
for NOx and 73% for SO2 by 2018, would be around 68% for the East and 266% for the 
West.
42  Table 1 presents EPA’s estimates of relative permit prices for the Clear Skies 





                                                                                                                                                                             
39 See id. at 160-168 (highlighting the importance of considering complex factors in analyzing the marginal 
net damage of polluting activity).   
40  See  EPA, IPM SYSTEM  SUMMARY  REPORT: IPM2000S153D_C.DOC, ENVIRONMENTAL  MEASURES 
REPORT OF CLEAR SKIES INITIATIVE 10.1, 10.29, 10.30, available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/epa-
ipm/results.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (offering tables of emissions at certain plants of SO2, NOx 
East, and NOx West). 
41  See EPA Regional Differentiation in the Clear Skies Initiative, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/geo-scope4_11.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002); see also Clear Skies Act of 
2002, S. 2815, 107
th Cong. § 451-3 (2002).   
42 See EPA, supra note 40, at 10.1, 10.29, 10.30.     11 
 
 
Marginal Costs of Controlling SO2 Emissions 
Relative to Marginal Costs of Controlling NOx Emissions 
(In Percent) 
Bush Administration Clear Skies Initiative
43 
NOx Region  2008-2012  2018-2022 
East 50  68 
West 75  266 
 
EIA recently estimated SO2 and NOx permit prices implicit in various emission 
control scenarios, and showed the price of NOx emissions permits would be less than the 
price of SO2 emissions permits.
44  These estimates provide information about the relative 
marginal control costs, since permit prices reflect marginal control costs.
45  The report 
analyzes three scenarios: 50%, 65% and 75% cuts in both NOx and SO2 emissions.  The 
estimated marginal cost of reducing SO2 emissions would be 17%, 29% and 14% in 
2010, respectively, of the marginal cost of reducing NOx emissions.
 46  In 2020 the report 
estimated the marginal cost of reducing SO2 emissions would be 65%, 95%, and 62%, 
respectively, of the marginal cost of reducing NOx emissions.
 47  
EPA also estimated permit prices for pollutant emissions cuts of interest to 
different Senators, and found that SO2 permit prices relative to NOx permit prices varied 
with different scenarios for emissions reductions. 
48 Since the President remains opposed 
                                                           
43 See EPA, supra note 40, at 10.1, 10.29, 10.30 (providing tables of emissions at certain plants of SO2, 
NOx East, and NOx West). 
44 See ENERGY INFO. ADMINISTRATION, supra note 35, at Table B14, C14, D14. 
45 See ENERGY INFO. ADMINISTRATION, supra note 35, at Table B14, C14, D14. These numbers were used 
in calculating marginal control costs for this article. 
46 See ENERGY INFO. ADMINISTRATION, supra note 35, at Table B14, C14, D14. The EIA also assumed in 
these scenarios that mercury emissions would be cut by 50 percent, 65 percent, and 75 percent, 
respectively.  See id. at vii.   
47 See ENERGY INFO. ADMINISTRATION, supra note 35, at Tables B14, C14, and D14. 
48 See EPA, ANALYSIS OF MULTI-EMISSIONS PROPOSALS FOR THE U.S. ELECTRICITY SECTOR REQUESTED 
BY  SENATORS  SMITH, VOINOVICH,  AND  BROWNBACK  9-10 (2001), available at     12 
 
 
to mandatory carbon emissions cuts,
49 we focus here on the scenarios without them.   
Relative marginal control costs for SO2 and NOx for different emissions reduction 
scenarios are reported in Table 2.  EPA attributes the differences between its estimates 
and EIA’s estimates to a variety of factors.
50  
                                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.epa.gov/air/meproposalsanalysis.pdf  (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (reporting in reponse to 
request by the senators for analyses of reductions of SO2, NOx, and Hg emissions).  In a separate report, 
the EPA estimated compliance costs and permit prices for emissions cuts of 75% for both NOx and SO2 in 
response to a request from Senators Jeffords and Lieberman. See Office of Atmospheric Programs, Office 
of Air and Radiation, EPA, Economic analysis of a Multi-Emissions Strategy Table 3 (Prepared for 
Senators James Jeffords and Joseph Lieberman; October 31, 2001), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/jeffordslieberm.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (showing incremental policy costs).  
The estimates in response to Senators Jeffords and Lieberman, however, are not directly comparable to 
those in the Clear Skies Initiative, the EIA’s, or the Smith/Voinovich/Brownback report because the EPA 
considered scenarios that included mandatory cuts in carbon dioxide emissions. See id.  
49 See letter by George W. Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts (May 13, 2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html  (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). 
50  See EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, Comparison of Jeffords-Lieberman and Smith-Voinovich-
Brownback 6-9 (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/finalanalyses.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). 
N.B.: None of the factors distinguishing the EPA and EIA analysis is directly relevant to an analysis of 
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50   65  212  NA 
65   95  134  NA 
75   62  110  17 to 20 
    
2.  Modeling Predicts Relative Incremental Control Costs. 
As the recent government analyses offer inadequate information to estimate the 
efficiency gains from integrating NOx and SO2 markets, we also use Haiku, a model of 
electricity markets developed by researchers at Resources for the Future, to generate 
estimates of permit prices and compliance costs.
54  The model has been compared with 
                                                           
51 See ENERGY INFO. ADMINISTRATION supra note 35, at tables B14, C14, and D14.  
52 See EPA, ANALYSIS OF MULTI-EMISSIONS PROPOSALS FOR THE U.S. ELECTRICITY SECTOR REQUESTED 
BY  SENATORS  SMITH, VOINOVICH,  AND  BROWNBACK  9-10 (2001), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/meproposalsanalysis.pdf  
53 See Office of Atmospheric Programs, Office of Air and Radiation, EPA, Economic analysis of a Multi-
Emissions Strategy 14 (Prepared for Senators James Jeffords and Joseph Lieberman; October 31, 2001), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/air/jeffordslieberm.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (showing incremental 
policy costs). 
54 See generally ANTHONY PAUL & DALLAS BURTRAW, THE RFF HAIKU ELECTRICITY MARKET MODEL 1 
(Resources for the Future, 2002), available at http://www.rff.org/reports/PDF_Files/haiku.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2002). The model has been used extensively in journal articles published in the peer-reviewed 
economics literature. See, e.g., Dallas Burtraw et al., Uncertainty and the Cost-Economics of Regional NOx 
Emissions Reductions from Electricity Generation (Resources for the Future, 2002), available at 
http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/PDF_files/0201.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002); see also Dallas Burtraw, et 
al., Ancillary Benefits of Reduced Air Pollution in the United States from Moderate Greenhouse Gas     14 
 
 
other simulation models in two series of meetings of Stanford University’s Energy 
Modeling Forum.
55  The Haiku electricity model simulates equilibrium in regional 
electricity markets and inter-regional electricity trade with an integrated algorithm for 
SO2 and NOX emission control technology choice.
56  The model calculates electricity 
demand, electricity prices, the composition of electricity supply, inter-regional electricity 
trading activity among 13 regions of the United States, and emissions of NOX, SO2, and 
carbon dioxide from electricity generation.
57  Three customer classes are represented: 
residential, industrial, and commercial.
58  Detail about demand functions is provided and 
supply curves are calculated for four time periods (super-peak, peak, shoulder, and 
baseload hours) in each of three seasons (summer, winter, and spring/fall).
59  The model 
determines investment in new generation capacity and retirement of existing facilities, 
based on capacity-related costs of providing service in the future (“going forward 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Mitigation Policies in the Electricity Sector (Resources for the Future, 2002) available at 
http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/PDF_files/0161.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002); see also Dallas Burtraw, et 
al., Cost-Effective Reduction of NOx  Emissions from Electricity Generation, 51 JOURNAL OF AIR & WASTE 
MANAGEMENT 1476-89 (2001). The model was also used for a study sponsored by the State of Maryland 
Department of Natural Resources. See Karen Palmer, et al., Electricity Restructuring, Environmental 
Policy, and Emissions, (Resources for the Future 2002), available at, http://www.rff.org/reports/2002.htm 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002). Further information on the model is available from the authors.  See also 
SPENCER  BANZHAF,  ET AL., EFFICIENT  EMISSION  FEES IN THE U.S. ELECTRICITY  SECTOR 2, 11-12 
(Resources for the Future, 2002); see also, Karen Palmer, et al., Capping Emissions: How Low Should We 
Go?, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY,  Dec. 2002, at 28-36 (2002). 
55  See E NERGY  MODELING  FORUM, FINAL  REPORT OF EMF WORKING  GROUP  15, A COMPETITIVE 
ELECTRICITY  INDUSTRY 22 (Stanford Univ., 1998), available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/home/index.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (summarizing a 
comparison of simulation models); see also E NERGY  MODELING  FORUM,  FINAL  REPORT OF EMF 
WORKING GROUP 17, PRICES AND EMISSIONS IN A RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY MARKET 1-6, 31 (Stanford 
Univ., 2001), available at  http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/home/index.html (last visited Dec. 20, 
2002). 
56 See ANTHONY PAUL & DALLAS BURTRAW, THE RFF HAIKU ELECTRICITY MARKET MODEL 1 (Resources 
for the Future Report, June 2002), available at http://www.rff.org/reports/PDF_Files/haiku.pdf  at 1 (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2002) (providing model documentation). 
57 See id. at 5. 
58 See id. at 7, 15, 16. 




60  Generator dispatch in the model is based on minimization of short run variable 
costs of generation.
61  The variable costs of emission controls plus the opportunity cost of 
emission allowances under cap-and-trade programs are added to the variable cost of 
generation in establishing the operation of generation capacity.
62 
The algorithm for compliance with NOX emissions caps in Haiku solves for the 
least cost set of post-combustion investments from among three control options: selective 
catalytic reduction (SCR), selective noncatalytic reduction (SNCR) and reburn.
63  For 
control of SO2, the model distinguishes coal-burning model plants by the presence or 
absence of flue gas desulfurization (scrubbers).  Unscrubbed coal plants have only one 
potential SO2 post-combustion abatement technology, a retrofit scrubber, but firms also 
may select from a series of coal types that vary by sulfur content and price as a strategy 
to reduce SO2 emissions.
64   
Estimates derived from the Haiku model for a scenario that is close to the 
Administration’s Clear Skies Initiative suggest relative incremental control costs, similar 
to EPA’s estimates.
65  For simplicity, we model only one scenario, picking emissions 
caps that approximate those we believe the 108
th Congress might adopt.    For the year 
2015, we assume caps for NOx and SO2 of 1.5 million and 2.5 million tons, respectively, 
                                                           
60 See id. at 18-22, 32. 
61  See A NTHONY  PAUL  & DALLAS  BURTRAW, THE  RFF HAIKU  ELECTRICITY  MARKET  MODEL 16-18   
(Resources for the Future, June 2002), available at http://www.rff.org/reports/PDF_Files/haiku.pdf  
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (providing model documentation). 
62 See id. at 25-26.    
63 See id. at 38-42. 
64 See id. at 36, 43-46. 
65 Unlike the Clear Skies Initiative, our scenario does not include an emissions cap for mercury.  See White 
House Clear Skies Initiative Fact Sheet, President Bush Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change 
Initiatives (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/clear skies factsheet.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 
2002) (predicting that implementation of the President’s Clear Skies Initiatives would reduce NOx 
emissions to 1.7 million tons and SO2 emissions to a cap of 3 million tons in 2018).     16 
 
 
but exclude caps for carbon and mercury emissions from our baseline analysis.
66  In this 
case, the price of SO2 allowance relative to the price of NOx allowances, that is the 
relative incremental control cost, is 1.4.
67   Compared with the relative incremental 
control cost estimates for the Clear Skies Initiative presented in Table 1, this estimate is 
greater than the figure for the East and less than the figure for the West.  
B.  Estimating Unnecessary Costs Requires Information on Relative 
Incremental Environmental Damages from NOx and SO2.  
   
Existing estimates of the marginal damages of NOx  and SO2 are at best 
approximations, but they indicate that the benefits of reducing SO2 are greater than the 
benefits of reducing NOx.  The government has provided recent estimates of the relative 
incremental damages from NOx and SO2.  The federal Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”) reported estimates of the benefits of reducing NOx  that were arguably 
methodologically superior to estimates that ignored the effects of NOx on particulates, 
and ranged from $960 to $2500 per ton for the emissions reductions from one rule, and 
from $1,350 to $2,100 per ton for the emissions reductions from another rule (issued 
under Section 126) in 2007.
68  We disagree with OMB estimates that depend on an 
assumption that NOx reductions have no particulate matter concentrations, because we 
believe that this assumption is indefensible.  The federal Office of Management and 
                                                           
66 The Clear Skies Initiative has an SO2 cap of 3.0 million tons and a NOx cap of 1.7 million tons.  See S. 
2815, 107
th Cong (2002). The Jeffords proposal has an NOx cap of 1.51 million tons and a SO2 cap of 2.25  
million tons.  See S. 556, 107
th Cong. (2002).  The timing of the two proposals varies, with Jeffords’ 
proposal achieving its ultimate reduction targets nearly a decade earlier.  See BILLY PRIZER & DALLAS 
BURTRAW, A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF S. 556 AND S. 2815 (Resources for the Future, 2002), at 
http://www.rff.org/Jeffords-Clear%20Skies%20table%209-25-02.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).  Also, 
both proposals include the opportunity for banking, which means that annual emissions would not 
approximate annual allowance allocations until after the bank reaches equilibrium.  Id. 
67 The numbers that we present are the arithmetic averages of the relevant values for the 11 year period 
from 2010 to 2020.     17 
 
 
Budget recently reported that the monetary benefits of reducing emissions of SO2 were 
$3,768 to $11,539 per ton.
69    Taking the ratio of lower bounds and upper bounds 
respectively suggests that SO2 damages are between 2.8 and 5.5 times greater than NOx 
damages.
70   
An analysis by EPA also supports the conclusion that reducing SO2 emissions is 
more valuable than reducing NOx emissions.
71  It suggests that mortality-related benefits 
per ton of NOx reduced are around $1,300 and the benefits per ton of SO2 reduced are 
around $7,300 for electricity generating units.
72 These estimates, which were intended to 
provide an “order of magnitude approximation rather than a precise estimate,”
73 reflect 
only the mortality-related benefits because the author believes these accounted “for over 
90 percent of monetary benefits in previous analyses.”
74  This EPA analysis suggests that 
the environmental damages from a ton of SO2 emissions are about 5.6 times greater than 
damages from a ton of NOx emissions.
75  
Academic research confirms these government estimates.  Economists 
report that reductions in sulfates, or more generally reductions in emissions of SO2, yield 
about 3.2 times more benefits per ton than reductions in nitrates, or more generally 
                                                                                                                                                                             
68    U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS 46 (2000), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2000fedreg-report.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2002). 
69 U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS 46 (2000), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2000fedreg-report.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2002). 
70 See generally id. (presenting information from which damage estimates can be calculated). 
71  See  Memorandum from Bryan Hubbell of the EPA’s Innovative Strategies and Economics Group 
entitled Benefits Associated with Electricity Generating Emissions Reductions Realized Under the NSR 
Program 1 (2002) (on file with the Fordham Environmental Law Journal). 
72 See id.   
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 See generally id. (providing information from which damage estimates were calculated).     18 
 
 
reductions in emissions of NOx.
76  An integrated assessment model, the Tracking and 
Analysis Framework (TAF), is used to explore a wide range of SO2 and NOx emission 
levels and locations.
77  Estimates of the marginal benefits of emission reductions 
generally vary widely with geography and with the modeler’s choice of parameters to 
describe atmospheric transport of pollutants, epidemiology, and economic valuation of 
health effects.
78  Yet, a robust relationship between the potency of sulfates and nitrates 
with respect to marginal benefits is reported.
79  Interestingly, their estimate may be 
relatively insensitive to new scientific information about the health risks or economic 
valuations of changes in health status. New information that affects the incremental 
benefits of SO2 and NOx by the same proportion will leave the relative incremental 
benefits unchanged.
80 
The true uncertainty is greater than implied by the range of existing estimates 
because the biological mechanism by which fine particles might cause mortality at the 
                                                           
76 See SPENCER BANZHAF, ET AL., EFFICIENT EMISSION FEES IN THE U.S. ELECTRICITY SECTOR 2, 11-12 
(Resources for the Future, 2002), available at  http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/PDF_files/0245.pdf (last 
visited  Dec. 20, 2002) (noting that differences in geographic location of emission cause large differences 
in marginal benefits). 
77 Tracking and Analysis Framework (“TAF”) was developed in support of the National Acid Precipitation 
Assessment Program (“NAPAP”) and is the work of a team of more than 30 modelers and scientists from 
institutions around the country.  See N ATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACID 
PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:  AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT A-
2, A-4 (1998), available at http://www.nnic.noaa.gov/CENR/NAPAP/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2002); see also 
id. at A-7.  Each module of TAF was constructed and refined by a group of experts in that field.  As the 
framework in which these literatures are integrated, TAF itself was subject to an extensive peer review in 
December 1995, which concluded that "TAF represent[s] a major advancement in our ability to perform 
integrated assessments" and that the model was ready for use by NAPAP.  See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL 
LABORATORY, PEER REVIEW OF THE TRACKING AND ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK (TAF) FOR USE IN THE 1996 
NAPAP INTEGRATED  ASSESSMENT 3 (ORNL/M-4994, 1995).  N.B.: The entire model is available at 
http://www.lumina.com/taflist (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). See generally, Cary Bloyd, ANL/DIS/TM-36, 
Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF) Model Documentation and User’s Guide (Argonne National 
Laboratory, 1996).  
78 See BANZHAF, ET AL., supra note 77, at 13-15.  See also Dallas Burtraw & Erin Mansur, Environmental 
Effects of SO2 Trading and Banking, 33 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 3489-94 (1999). 
79 See BANZHAF, ET AL., supra note 77, at 11-12, Figures 2a, 2b.    
80 See BANZHAF, ET AL., supra note 77, at 14.       19 
 
 
relevant concentration (for example, 15 micrograms per cubic meter of particulate matter 
with a diameter of less than 2.5 microns) has not yet been identified.
81   
III.  Quantitative Analysis Shows Reduced Compliance Costs From 
Integrating NOx AND SO2 Permit Markets. 
 
Integrating NOx-SO2 permit markets can generate significant cost savings.  The 
government cannot provide these savings simply by legislating an emissions cap because 
relative control costs will change over time, and such changes will alter the most cost-
effective combination of emissions controls.
82  Integrating the two markets with an 
appropriate trading ratio will allow for the greatest possible cost savings irrespective of 
how developing control technologies may affect the relative cost of reducing NOx and 
SO2.  
A. Baseline Assumptions. 
For simplicity, we focus on one scenario, picking emissions caps that approximate 
those we believe the 108
th Congress might adopt.  In our judgment, however, our 
quantitative estimates would change only slightly with small variations in NOx and SO2 
caps, although they might vary significantly if carbon emissions were also subject to a 
stringent cap.  For the year 2015, we assume caps for NOx and SO2 of 1.5 million and 2.5 
million tons, respectively, but exclude caps for carbon and mercury emissions from our 
baseline analysis.
83  In this case, the price of SO2 allowance relative to the price of NOx 
                                                           
81 See NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT-RTP OFFICE, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/P-99/002BB, SECOND EXTERNAL REVIEW DRAFT OF AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR 
PARTICULATE  MATTER  Vol.II, page 8-10 (March, 2001), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ncea/pdfs/partmatt/VOL_II_AQCD PM_2nd_Review_Draft.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 
2002) (discussing limited available data to discern mortality rates). 
82 See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 37, at 41.   
83 The Clear Skies Initiative has an SO2 cap of 3.0 million tons and a NOx cap of 1.7 million tons.  See S. 
2815, 107
th Congress (2002).  The Jeffords Proposal has an NOx cap of 1.51 million tons and a SO2 cap of 
2.25 million tons.  See S. 556 107
th Congress (2002).  The timing of the two proposals varies, with the     20 
 
 
allowances, that is the relative incremental control cost, is 1.4.
84  Under such an approach, 
the market is willing to reduce SO2 emissions by one ton in exchange for increasing NOx 
emissions by 1.4 tons.
85  We also presume that the relative incremental environmental 
damage from SO2 is 3 times as great as from NOx,
 86 although we address in a later 
section the implications of uncertainty in this estimate. 
B. Calculating Savings from Integrating NOX and SO2 Markets.  
The level of NOx and SO2 emissions as they may be capped by the 108
th Congress 
is shown as point B – the baseline scenario – in Figure 3.  Points on a line with a slope of 
–3 that goes through the baseline scenario at point B thus have emissions levels that offer 
environmental protections equivalent to point B.  Allowing firms to acquire one SO2 
permit in exchange for three NOx permits, or vice versa, would shift emissions along this 
line.  Such shifts would continue until the relative incremental cost of controlling 
emissions equals the exchange rate of three NOx to one SO2.  At any other level of 
emissions firms could make money by buying the relatively inexpensive permit from the 
market, exchanging it for the relatively more expensive one, and then selling it for cash.  
We identify two points (J and K) on this trading line that have ratios of marginal costs 
illustrated by the isocost curves that have slopes somewhat less than and somewhat 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Jeffords Proposal achieving its ultimate reduction targets nearly a decade earlier.  See B ILLY PIZER & 
DALLAS BURTRAW, A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF S. 556 AND S. 2815 (2002), at 
 http://www.rff.org/Jeffords-Clear%20Skies%20table%209-25-02.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002)  Also, 
both proposals include the opportunity for banking, which means that annual emissions would not 
approximate annual allowance allocations until after the bank reaches equilibrium. 
84 The numbers that we present are the arithmetic averages of the relevant values for the 11 year period 
from 2010 to 2020. 
85 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing relative permit prices).  The relative permit price is 
1.4, which means that the incremental cost of controlling one ton of SO2 is 1.4 times the incremental cost 
of controlling one ton of NOx.  Thus, increasing NOx emissions by 1.4 tons will lower control costs by the 
same amount as a reduction in SO2 emissions of one ton.  Since such a change in emissions would not raise 
control costs, we assume that emissions sources would be willing to undertake such a change.  
86 See BANZHAF, ET AL., supra note 77, at 2, 11-12; see, e.g., OMB, supra note 22, at 46.       21 
 
 
greater than –3.  The lowest cost point on this line lies between these two points J and K 
in Figure 3, where an isocost curve with a slope of –3 is just tangent to the line.   
This analysis suggests that integrating markets for NOx and SO2 permits could 
reduce compliance costs by at least $1.1 billion annually, from $11.8 billion to $10.6 
billion.
87  The $1.1 billion excludes changes in the consumer surplus from higher 
electricity prices, which are typically smaller than compliance costs.
88  From a baseline 
scenario that resembles Clear Skies, market integration (shown by points J and K) would 
increase NOx emissions between 1.5 million and 2 million tons per year, while lowering 
SO2 emissions by 0.5 million to 0.67 million per year according to analysis using the 
Haiku model.   Given the evidence that the benefits of reducing SO2 are about three times 
as large as the benefits of reducing NOx, this change in the mix of emissions would not 
reduce expected environmental protection.  
  C.  Dealing With Uncertainty 
    Montero (2002) analyzes in detail the merit of integrating related pollutant 
markets when regulators face uncertainty about the marginal benefits of different 
pollutants.
89  He shows that even with uncertainty about the benefits, as long as the 
marginal cost curve is steeper than the marginal benefits curve - that is, the absolute 
value of marginal costs are greater than marginal benefits in the vicinity of emissions 
                                                           
87 These estimates reflect the average of the annual cost savings over the years 2010 to 2020.  During this 
period the Clear Skies Initiative involves increasingly stringent caps.  See EPA, Clear Skies Initiative 
Summary 6,12  (2002),  available at  http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/clearskiessummary04-11.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2002) (graphing the cost of SO2 and NOx reductions for 2010-2020).  N.B.: Cost savings 
in a particular year are not necessarily representative.  
88  See  Karen Palmer, et al., Restructuring and the Cost of  Reducing NOx Emissions in Electricity 
Generation (Resources for the Future, 2001), available at 
http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/PDF_files/0110REV.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). 
89 See Juan Pablo Montero, Multipollutant Markets, 32 RAND J. ECON. 762-74 (2002).     22 
 
 
targets - the economically optimal policy is to integrate the pollutant control markets.
90  
The rationale is that interpollutant trading provides flexibility to firms to avoid high 
control costs by shifting control efforts to a pollutant that is relatively inexpensive to 
control.  If the marginal cost curves are steeper than the marginal benefit curves, the 
regulator should pay more attention to the cost of control rather than the amount of 
control, and therefore, markets should be integrated.
91      
  There are several reasons to believe that marginal cost curves are steeper than the 
marginal benefit curves.  The marginal benefit curves are essentially flat, because the 
values of the risk reduction from exposure to fine particles, which are the vast majority of 
all benefits, appear to vary linearly with concentration.
92  In addition, NOx and SO2 from 
power utilities are only a relatively small share of total emissions, so the change in 
emissions from these sources will have a diluted impact on aggregate emissions and air 
quality.
93   
IV. Adverse Environmental and Health Effects of Trading Can Be Controlled.  
Integrating NOx and SO2 markets is only a small departure from current policy.  
All major legislative proposals allow NOx and SO2 emissions from any given plant to 
depend in large part on market conditions, while setting national emissions rates by 
statute.
94  However, current programs do not fix national NOx levels.  For example, plants 
                                                           
90 See id. at 762.   
91 See id. at 763. In the other case, where the marginal benefit curves are steeper, the regulator should pay 
more attention to the amount of control in each market, and therefore the markets should be separated.   Id.   
92 See OFFICE OF POLICY, OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-410-R-99-
001, BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT:  1990-2010, EPA REPORT TO CONGRESS, p. 57, D-8, D-
9 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/1990-2010/frullrept.pdf (last visited  Dec. 20, 2002). 
93 See POLICY BOOK, supra note 17. See footnote 101.   
94 See S. 556, 107
th Cong. § 706 (2002); S. 588, 107
th Cong. §§ 4(b), 7 (2002); S. 2815, 107
th Cong. § 403 
(2002); H.R. 5277, 107
th Cong. § 403 (2002); H.R. 1256, 107
th Cong. § 2(b)(B) (2002) (providing for 
trading); see also S. 556, 107
th Cong. § 704 (2002); S. 588, 107
th Cong. § 2 (2002); S. 2815, 107
th Cong.     23 
 
 
with dissimilar access to low-sulfur coal or with different incremental control costs 
would emit different mixtures of NOx and SO2 for any given set of emission permit 
market prices.  In this sense, an exchange of SO2 permits for NOx permits is not 
qualitatively different in its effects on environmental protection than the type of trading 
already in place.  Trading NOx for SO2 is unlikely to weaken environmental protection 
relative to existing and likely programs.   
A.  Managing Risks 
Deriving an unbiased estimate of relative damages is difficult.  For this reason, it 
may be worth considering approaches that reduce the risk that integrating NOx and SO2 
markets actually damages the environment.  The simplest approach would be for a 
government office simply to exchange permits in a way that reduces expected 
environmental damages.  For example, a government office could sell 30 NOx permits in 
exchange for 11 SO2 permits (or sell 10 SO2 permits for 33 NOx permits).  Either trade 
would provide a tax “for the environment” of ten percent given that expected 
environmental damages from SO2 are three times as great as from NOx.  As long as the 
tax is not excessive, trades at these distinct exchange rates would reduce expected 
environmental damages.
95 
To illustrate the potential magnitude of environmental benefits from this 
approach, we consider a case where the government grants permits to emit two tons of 
NOx in exchange for a permit to emit a ton of SO2.  As noted earlier, two tons of NOx 
                                                                                                                                                                             
§§ 413-4, 441 (2002); H.R. 5266, 107
th Cong. §§ 413-4, 441 (2002); H.R. 1256, 107
th Cong. § 2 (2002) 
(limiting emissions).     
95 Offset programs in areas that do not attain national ambient air quality standards already require such 
emission reduction ratios.  Many analysts believe, however, that these ratios have significantly impeded 
trading.  See Bob Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where did all the Markets Go?  An Analysis of EPA’s 
Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109,146 (1989) (analyzing the EPA’s emissions trading     24 
 
 
cause less expected environmental damage than a ton of SO2.   In this case, from the 
baseline of 1.5 million tons of NOx and 2.5 million tons of SO2, firms would willingly 
exchange permits for a half million tons of SO2 in order to obtain permits to emit an 
additional million tons of NOx.  To see this, note that they could profit by such trades 
because our analysis with the Haiku model indicates that in the baseline scenario a permit 
to emit a ton of SO2 is about 1.4 times as expensive as a permit to emit a ton of NOx.  
Firms that give up permits to emit 10 tons of SO2 in exchange for permits to emit 20 tons 
of NOx would profit by the value of permits to emit 6 tons of NOx. Such profitable 
exchanges would continue until the cost of reducing SO2 emissions rose to equal twice 
the cost of reducing NOx emissions.
96  Our analysis with the Haiku model implies that 
this condition would occur with annual NOx emissions of 2.5 million tons and annual SO2 
emissions of 2 million tons.  The Haiku model indicates that the costs of achieving these 
emissions limits are $800 million per year less than in the baseline scenario, but net 
environmental damages have also fallen by the equivalent of a half million tons of NOx.  
The reductions in SO2 emissions of a half million tons per year from the baseline scenario 
have environmental benefits equivalent to 1.5 million tons of NOx, given the evidence 
summarized above that the incremental environmental damages of a ton of NOx 
emissions are about a third of the incremental damages of a ton of SO2.  These benefits 
outweigh by an amount equivalent to about a half million tons of NOx the environmental 
damages from increased NOx emissions relative to the baseline scenario. 
A refinement of this approach would allow different exchange rates for different 
ratios of NOx and SO2 emissions.  It may make sense to allow further increases in NOx 
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emissions only in exchange for progressively larger reductions in SO2 emissions.  For 
example, as NOx emissions from power plants increase, municipalities may find it harder 
to meet EPA's ozone air quality standard because NOx, but not SO2, contributes to 
ozone.
97  Regulators could allow firms to get 30 NOx permits for every 10 SO2 permits, 
but only up to a given level, beyond which the rate might change to 30 to 11.   
To further reduce the risk of adverse environmental effects from NOx-SO2 
exchanges, Congress, after authorizing trades between NOx and SO2, could charge EPA 
with reviewing new scientific evidence to assess whether exchange rates reflect unbiased 
estimates of relative incremental environmental damages.  Congress could authorize EPA 
to change the exchange rate through rulemaking if it concluded that the exchange rate 
lowered air quality.  
B.  State and Local Health-Based Regulations Will Buttress Federal Trading 
Approaches 
 
Some public health advocates may oppose NOx-SO2 trading because increases in 
emissions of NOx emissions - but not SO2 emissions - can result in elevated ozone 
concentrations. Although ozone is a less significant health risk than particulates formed 
from sulfates and nitrates, ozone is associated with childhood asthma attacks.
98  There 
may be concerns that families should not bear increased risks of asthma attacks in 
children in exchange for reduced mortality from particulates that would primarily affect 
elderly parents.    
There are several flaws with this argument.  Although NOx may contribute to 
more frequent asthma attacks among children, NOx emissions from utilities under either 
                                                                                                                                                                             
96 At this point the government would be offering to exchange SO2 permits for NOx permits of equal value.  
97 See EPA Air Quality Standard For Ozone, 40 C.F.R. §§ 53.1-53.21, 58.1-58.32 (1997).     26 
 
 
S.556 or the Clear Skies Initiative would be around 8 % to 10 % of total NOx emissions, 
so a given percentage increase in utilities’ NOx emissions is a much smaller percentage 
increase in the total.
99  Further, the philosophy and strategy of Title I of the Clean Air Act 
is to allow states to choose how, but not whether, to meet federally mandated health-
based ozone standards.
100  The multi-pollutant bills will be buttressed by additional local 
emissions reductions in locales where air quality is poor.
101 
Conclusion  
Congress should encourage changes in the mix of NOx and SO2 emissions, in 
particular, reductions in emissions of the pollutant for which the bang for the buck is 
greater.   Existing legislative proposals to control multiple pollutants from power plants 
do not take advantage of opportunities to reduce both environmental damages and 
compliance costs because they adopt a pollutant-by-pollutant approach, and prohibit 
shifts in the mix of  NOx and SO2 emissions.   
While choosing the right NOx-SO2 exchange rate may be difficult, there is no 
doubt that an outright prohibition of such transactions is excessively prescriptive and 
burdensome.  It makes sense only given the irrational assumption that a reduction in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
98 See id. 
99 We calculate 8 % as a ratio between the S.556 proposal of 1,550,000 tons of NOx emissions and total 
NOx emissions from all anthropogenic sources in 2007 as projected in the regulatory analysis for EPA’s 
2000 Heavy Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 
or 20,600,000 tons.  See OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA420-R-00-026, 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS:  HEAVY DUTY ENGINE AND VEHICLE STANDARDS AND HIGHWAY DIESEL 
FUEL  SULFUR  CONTROL  REQUIREMENTS 145, Table II.B-27 (2000), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/hd2007/frm/ria-ii.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (listing total NOx 
emissions in 2007 along with components due to vehicles and other sources).  Ten percent is the Clear 
Skies Initiative’s emissions cap of 1,700,000 tons of NOx emissions in 2018 relative to the total emissions 
of NOx from anthropogenic sources in 2020 as projected in the same analysis, or 17,900,000 tons.  See S. 
556 107
th Cong. § 704 (Jeffords Proposal NOx emissions levels); EPA Fact Sheet on Clear Skies Initiative 
2 (2002), available at  http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/clearskiesfactsheet_3_26.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 
2002) (Clear Skies Initiative NOx emissions levels). 
100 See Clean Air Act § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410.     27 
 
 
national emissions of NOx (or SO2), regardless of its size, could never compensate for a 
one-ton increase in emissions of SO2 (NOx).  Yet, all multi-pollutant proposals offered to 
date embody this approach.   Since the appropriate exchange rate may be hard for 
Congress to set, it should direct EPA to set it in rulemaking to be equal to the ratio of 
expected incremental damages.   
Congress should abandon the pollutant-by-pollutant approach that it has used to 
develop new emissions legislation because it is incompatible with cost-effective 
environmental protection.  The mix of emissions should vary with control costs and not 
be set at absolute and unchanging statutory levels.  Allowing markets to choose the 
lowest-cost set of NOx and SO2 emissions from among ones with equivalent 
environmental effects will lower the costs of emissions controls. Economic modeling 
suggests that cost savings from integrating NOx and SO2 markets could exceed $1.1 
billion per year without reductions in environmental benefits. This no-lose solution 
should interest both those environmentalists and industry representatives who promote 
cost-effective clean air policy. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
101 The purposes of the bills do not include a goal to eliminate the need for additional local emissions 
reductions.  See, e.g., S. 556, 107
th Cong. (2001) and H.R. 5266, 107
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Note: The curve that goes through the H.R.1256 emissions cap represents the set of NOx 
and SO2 emissions where compliance costs are approximately constant, based on EIA’s 
estimates of SO2 and NOx permit prices for the emissions reductions in an earlier version 
of S.556, which was identical to H.R. 1256. Effective dates for the bills differ slightly.  
Emissions allowance caps for S.556, which are very similar to those in H.R. 1256, would 
be effective in 2008; the NOx cap in S.588 would begin in 2004 and grow until 2007; 
H.R. 1256 would be effective in 2007, while the Administration’s Clear Skies proposal 
would take effect in 2008 and specify increasingly stringent caps for 2010 and 2018. 
Banking enables emissions to remain above allowance caps until the bank is exhausted. 
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Note: The diamonds labeled Clear Skies, “♦”, represent emissions in 2010 and 2018 under the Bush 
Administration’s proposal.  The squares representing points B, J and K refer to annual levels of NOx and 
SO2 emissions averaged over the years 2010 to 2020.  The iso-cost curves going through these three points 
are the sets of NOx and SO2 emissions where annual control costs are constant at $11.8 billion, $10.7 
billion and $10.6 billion respectively.  The slopes of the various iso-cost curves at the points B, J and K 
represent the incremental costs of controlling SO2 relative to the incremental costs of controlling NOx. The 
iso-damage line represents the combination of NOx and SO2 emissions expected to offer the same 
protection to health and the environment as point B.  It assumes that one ton of SO2 is as damaging as 3 
tons of NOx.. Since points B, J and K all offer the same level of protection, but differ by at least $1 billion 
annually in control costs, allowing firms collectively to increase NOx emissions in exchange for additional 
SO2 reductions, should save at least $1 billion annually without lowering environmental protection.   
   
 
 